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1.  Introduction 
 
The clinical negligence system is the means by which patients who can be proved to have 
received unsatisfactory (i.e. negligent) medical care can receive compensation.  Debate 
about the way in which the UK (and others) achieve this, and whether suitable 
alternatives are available, has never been far away from this understandably sensitive 
topic.  Current policy debate illustrates the perceived causes for concern.  In the past 
three months, the National Audit Office [6], a major public inquiry [5] and the 
Department of Health [2] have all criticised and identified areas for reform.  Thus, the 
government describes clinical negligence in the UK as “slow and bureaucratic” and 
contributing, via its adversarial arrangements, to a “‘cover-up’ culture”. The Kennedy 
Report suggests that such litigation-induced paranoia contributed to a lack of 
transparency in the Bristol heart inquiry.  The NAO’s research indicated that cases 
opened in 1999/00 took, on average, five and a half years to settle, and that 44% of the 
cases it sampled produced legal costs greater than the damages paid.  Costs are 
“spiralling” [2] to £400 million in 1999/00.  The case against the present system is clear 
cut. 
 
Or is it?  Based on information such as that above, the government has promised a White 
Paper in 2001 aimed at reform of the clinical negligence system in the UK.  It will first 
institute a programme of research into the present system and its alternatives.  
Undoubtedly, there is much to be said for such research and for reviewing the policy 
options some twenty years after this last happened.  However, it is likely that an open-
minded review of the options will reveal a less one-sided case than the above precis 
implies.  For example, evidence for the cost-effectiveness of alternative systems of 
compensation for ‘medical injuries’ is ambiguous; the extent to which such alternatives 
help deter future malpractice is dubious; the costs of the current system may not be quite 
so drastic as some ‘headline figures’ would suggest; and it is arguable that some measure 
of improvement could be achieved through more general reform of the legal system as 
opposed to reforming the basis for compensation in medical cases per se.  As [1, p. 389] 
remarks: “In practice, the choice is between imperfect alternatives on the basis of less 
than complete empirical evidence.” 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a brief description of the 
economic rationale for a system of clinical negligence.  This is followed by an account of 
the way in which the present system in the UK operates.  Section 4 then discusses the 
performance of the current system and Section 5 looks at the no-fault option for reform.  
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The economic role of negligence rules 
 
Tort liability (where wronged parties may claim damages after establishing others’ 
negligence) serves two functions: it provides compensation (‘insurance’) and, by linking 
this to the source of the damages, it provides deterrence of future negligent behaviour.   
However, it is widely accepted that, if compensation is the objective of the system, then 
tort is not the most cost-effective way of achieving this: other methods of insurance 
(public or private) can compensate patients quicker and at lower administrative cost.  
Accordingly, the (economic) arguments for using a negligence-based rule lie in its 
deterrence effects: its ability to induce parties to engage in costly measures to take care. 
 
In any system involving costs and benefits of taking care, it is possible to define an 
efficient standard of care.  This minimises the total social costs of the activity in question 
(in this case, providing medical treatment); in particular, equating the marginal unit of 
prevention costs with the marginal unit of ‘harm’ saved.  In principle, a variety of 
standards of care (such as ‘strict liability’ and ‘negligence’) can achieve this goal but only 
under specified conditions.  These involve all relevant actors (patients, doctors, courts, 
insurers) having full information about the consequences of their actions and the 
behaviour of others.  It is the difficulty of fulfilling these conditions that can make 
liability an inefficient basis for providing compensation.  For example, in the case of 
negligence, if the courts cannot set a standard of care and interpret it in a predictable way, 
poorly informed patients will bring some weak cases while ignoring other strong ones.  
Depending on the balance of these possibilities, clinicians may invest too much in care 
(‘defensive medicine’) or too little. 
 
These observations create a problem for assessing the clinical negligence system: it has 
not been possible to estimate the extent and costs of the deterrence benefits of negligence.  
It is also difficult to estimate the extent of defensive medicine, for reasons of data 
availability and because this concept is correctly defined relative to the (unobservable) 
efficient level of care.  This means that the net benefits of operating a negligence system 
cannot be directly computed.  After a series of papers, [1] concludes that positive net 
benefits are “possible but not assured.” (p. 412).  Evidence also suggests that negligence 
rules are successful in screening amongst cases.  Typically, those where a Trust deems 
itself to be liable for the damages caused have a higher probability of producing a payout 
to the patient and, also, of settling early.  This suggests that the system does not work 
with the degree of randomness of which it is sometimes accused.  
 
3. The current system of clinical negligence in the UK 
 
To succeed in a clinical negligence claim, a patient must demonstrate s/he was owed a 
duty of care that was breached; that the breach clearly led to the damages claimed; and 
that the damages claimed are, indeed, accurate.  Effectively, the patient must prove 
liability (based on negligence) on the part of the defendant and quantum.  This will 
involve solicitors, perhaps barristers and the courts and might require protracted, costly 
legal proceedings: hence the criticisms laid out above.  Lord Woolf’s 1996 reforms of 
civil procedure in England and Wales noted that clinical negligence cases might suffer 
especially from these problems because of the complex and lengthy nature of the causes 
and paths of illness.   
 
The institutions designed to administer this system have changed over the last decade or 
so.  Prior to 1990, clinicians were individually liable for the consequences of their 
negligence, and therefore patients frequently cited both the hospital and the clinician 
when bringing a claim.  The hospital, as part of the NHS, would meet the cost out of its 
budget, while the clinician would meet the cost from one of several medical practitioners’ 
risk pools to which he or she subscribed.  After 1990, the NHS assumed responsibility for 
clinicians’ negligence in the course of NHS work, so that patients now claim against the 
hospital in question.  One rationale for this change was that hospitals are better placed 
than individual clinicians to institute risk management policies, although, for such 
policies to be successful, the hospital must resolve the principal-agent problem that may 
arise between itself and its employees.  NHS hospital Trusts now have a certain amount 
of financial autonomy, and can in principle pass on some of this risk from medical 
accidents to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) who commission treatment.   
 
The NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) was established in 1995 to administer cases by 
overseeing the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) and, since 1996, the 
Existing Liabilities Scheme (ELS).  The CNST is a form of pooling arrangement amongst 
Trusts.  It meets claims in return for ‘premium’ income.  As with other insurance, Trusts 
can influence their premiums by choosing an excess, below which they meet all the costs 
of a claim.  They pay 20% of costs above the excess up to a pre-specified threshold.  
Premiums are also related to the risk management standards attained by the Trust, as 
assessed by the NHSLA (66% of Trusts are at Level 1, with Level 3 the highest.)  The 
ELS covered liabilities for pre-1995 incidents with estimated settlement costs (included 
damage payout) above £10,000. 
 
Other public bodies also play an important role in the clinical negligence scheme, in 
particular the Lord Chancellor’s Department and the Legal Services Commission.  These 
operate, respectively, the system of civil procedure within which claims take place, and 
the legal aid scheme, which funded 7,375 claims in 1999/00. 
 
 
4. The cost of the UK’s clinical negligence system 
 
Using NHSLA data and its own survey evidence, the NAO estimates a total of 23,000 
open claims at 31
st
 March, 2000.  To track changes in the frequency of new claims over 
time, [3] analyses the totality of claims arising within the Oxfordshire Health Authority 
over the period 1974 -1998.  They find that the rate of claims per thousand finished 
consultant episodes increased from 0.46 in 1990 to 0.81 in 1998.  However, when a 30% 
increase in hospital activity over the period is borne in mind, this amounts to an annual 
growth rate of 7%.  As the authors remark, this is a “substantial rate of growth but not the 
uncontrolled explosion sometimes alluded to in the wider media.” (p. 1567). Much of the 
media coverage has, in fact, focused on the estimates of outstanding clinical negligence 
liabilities – that is, the claims against the NHS that have yet to be paid.  For example, 
NHS accounts made a provision for future clinical negligence liabilities of £2.6 billion in 
1999/00, while the NHSLA’s estimate (based only on larger cases) was £4.3 billion.   
However, these estimates are by their nature speculative, and may to some extent be 
based on ‘worst case scenarios’. Moreover, because litigation can be an extremely 
lengthy process, these estimates can relate to claims that are settled over many years, 
even decades, into the future. 
 
An alternative strategy for calculating the cost of claims begins with existing data on 
recent claims and seeks to estimate the cash cost (i.e. money actually paid out) in a given 
financial year.  Apart from providing a more suitable basis for assessing the cost of the 
system, this has the benefit of relying on ‘hard data’.  [3] performs such an analysis, 
based on detailed case-level information from Trusts within Oxfordshire Health 
Authority.  They estimate a figure for cash paid by the NHS in 1998 of £84 million (£61 
million in damages; £23 million in defence costs).  Whilst several sizeable future claims 
and some recent legal developments may mean this figure is relatively low (for example, 
House of Lords’ decision in 1998 is likely to increase damages on child cases by 25-
40%), it still represents a significant reduction compared to the figures above.  
 
Two conclusions can, perhaps, be gleaned from this discussion.  First, it is not clear that 
the clinical negligence system the UK is as expensive as some figures suggest.  Not only 
is a range of estimates available here; we might also add that none of the present 
estimates nets off any deterrence benefits or includes any additional costs of defensive 
medicine.  Second, the alterations to the system that took place in the mid-90s have made 
it difficult to gather data on the cash cost of the system: the division of responsibilities 
amongst various public bodies has meant that data are housed in different places. 
 
5. The ‘no-fault’ alternative 
 
A variety of reform proposals have surfaced as a replacement to tort law.  Rather than 
evaluate all of these, the current paper considers the principal suggestion: a move to ‘no -
fault’ compensation for medical injuries (see [1] and [7] for surveys).  This would allow 
compensation to patients without the need to establish negligence on the part of the Trust 
and is one of the solutions to be considered by the recently established Working Party 
preparing the government’s clinical negligence White Paper [2].  The perceived benefits 
of such a move include 
 Removing the need for adversarial legal procedure to establish fault.  This, in 
turn, would lower the costs of the system, reduce delay and improve patients’ 
claims experience. 
 Encouraging a culture of openness in the NHS.  This would be fostered by 
cliniciains and other NHS staff being more willing to raise concerns and admit to 
errors if relieved from the fear of high-profile litigation. 
 Encouraging the use of other (non-financial) remedies.  Studies indicate that 
patients often do not require financial compensation, so much as an explanation, 
apology and reassaurance that faulty care systems have been reformed.  The tort 
system is specifically not designed to provide these.  
 
Let us consider each of these in turn.   
 
Legal procedure and costs 
We have seen that 44% of clinical negligence cases incur legal costs above the damages 
they recover.  This seems unsatisfactory.  The situation is similar elsewhere: [1] reports 
that up to 40 cents per dollar of clinician insurance premiums in the US ultimately goes to 
lawyers.  In contrast, figures for Sweden and New Zealand (who have both introduced 
variants of no-fault schemes) appear much lower; e.g. less than 10% of total expenditure 
in New Zealand’s case.  However, such figures can be misleading.  In New Zealand, for 
example, this result was been achieved by effectively “rubber-stamping” claims and 
paying with only limited investigation.  The hidden social cost of this, in terms of 
reduced deterrence and increased accidents is unknown.  The low budget cost in Sweden 
has been achieved by a ‘collateral offset rule’ (where the damages paid are offset against 
compensation available from other sources), relatively low awards given the generosity 
of the Swedish social security system, and with tight criteria for offering compensation.  
Of course, costs will be influenced by the volume of claims that would be made.  
Unfortunately, there is no reliable evidence on the possible elasticity of claims behaviour 
in the UK; recent work [8] suggests that roughly 10% of patients admitted to two London 
acute hospitals suffered an adverse event, with a half of these be ‘preventable’. The 
claims we currently observe may, thus, represent only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in this 
respect and a change to the basis of claiming could encourage claims that, presently, 
would not succeed.  It would be important to gain some estimate of what is ‘below the 
water’ before adopting the no-fault principle and deciding on its precise arrangements.   
 
No-fault schemes do not dispense with the need for evidence, adjudication and (possibly) 
representation because it is necessary for the patient to establish the extent of the claim 
and that it arose through some aspect of medical treatment.   In New Zealand, a relaxed 
definition of the circumstances eligible for compensation led to a fast increase in claims 
and, in 1992, to tighter eligibility criteria (based on fault).  Thus, the criterion of “medical 
misadventure” was replaced by “personal injury resulting from medical error or medical 
mishap”, with “medical error” being defined in terms of failure to observe a “standard of 
care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances”; a clear move towards the 
criteria applied in tort.  Hence, no-fault compensation may still generate (potentially) 
costly, protracted, adversarial legal disputes.   
 
Even if this were not the case, it is unclear that no-fault schemes would eradicate delay.  
As [4] shows, considerable delay is due to the parties waiting to see how injuries evolve.  
In complex medical cases, this can take several years.  In their study, the Trust’s mean 
estimate of damages increased from £40,000 to £140,000 as cases lengthened from two to 
six years.  Any serious attempt to eradicate delay would, it appears, have to allow for 
‘top-up’ payments over time or establish ‘intervention type’ as the basis for payment.  
These would neither remove uncertainty, nor enhance fairness. 
 
It is finally worth noting that, if matters of legal procedure are contributing to problems 
with clinical negligence, the appropriate response may be reform within the legal system 
rather than wholesale withdrawal from it.  Lord Woolf’s pre-action protocols have so far 
received only limited evaluation but measures such as this could help contain the worst 
excesses of cost.  Contingency fees may also provide an effective way of keeping costs 
below damages.   
 
Culture of openness 
Is it necessarily the case that clinicians (and other NHS staff) will feel more obliged to 
highlight errors in a world where they are not held responsible for their actions?  This 
would imply that they are not worried about their reputations and the opinions of their 
peers if they have caused damage; that the system for determining eligibility under no-
fault compensation would not engage them in lengthy, high-profile negotiations; and that 
their employers would not, at some point, decide that sanctions were appropriate.  None 
of these seems especially convincing and it might be argued that failure to sanction a 
(repeat) ‘offender’ was a substantial denial of patients’ interests.  Tragedies like that at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary [5] also highlight breakdowns in the NHS’s willingness to 
listen to, and support, “whistle-blowers” and it may be that actions here would make 
valuable changes to openness within the NHS. 
 
Appropriate compensation  
A body of survey evidence suggests that many negligence claimants feel ‘forced’ into 
seeking financial redress for the harm they have suffered.  Many say they initiated their 
claim in order to receive an explanation of (and, if appropriate, apology for) their 
situation.  They are also interested to know what remedial measures have been taken to 
prevent similar events in the future.   It is difficult for the NHS to accommodate such 
preferences against a background where litigation is possible for fear of prejudicing any 
subsequent case.  It might be argued that a no-fault scheme dilutes this problem 
(assuming claimants are able to achieve satisfactory ‘closure’ by seeing remedial 
measures in action, if necessary) by reducing the need to rely on admissions of error by 
the Trust. 
 
Undeniably, it is important to bear such evidence in mind when looking to compensate 
medical injuries.  However, we have seen that a no-fault scheme is unlikely to remove 
completely a Trust’s concern about implicating itself.  It is also true that for some 
claimants, ‘blame’ is an important motivation and it is unclear how we should weight 
these two competing sets of preferences.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The most appropriate method of compensating patients (or their families) for damage 
suffered during medical care will always arouse passionate debate.  Patient health is, 
rightly, a sensitive topic and must be balanced against the inevitable probabilities of harm 
involved in some (indeed, all) medical interventions; clinicians need some freedom to 
perform delicate tasks.  At the same time, there are many demands on public expenditure 
and it is right to question apparently expensive programmes to see whether goals can be 
achieved more effectively.  This complex web of issues has been explored in a variety of 
countries (producing equally varied answers) and is now the subject of policy scrutiny in 
the UK.   
 
In this paper, we have suggested several factors that should not be overlooked when 
considering policy reform in this area.  Perhaps two are especially important.  First, while 
an ideal world would allow cost-benefit analyses of the existing scheme and reform 
options, a combination of data availability, measurement difficulty and institutional 
variety make this impossible (in the UK and elsewhere).  We can, however, observe that 
the costs of the existing system in the UK may not be as large as some estimates suggest, 
and that alternative schemes tend not to work as cheaply as might originally be 
envisaged.  Second, the key economic benefit of a fault-based compensation system is its 
deterrence effects.  Undeniably, our inability to quantify this makes it hard to factor into 
any debate but this should not mean that it is ignored.  Schemes that are not based on 
fault need to address the issue of how deterrence will be achieved or, if not, what the 
consequences might be.  Clinical governance schemes are sometimes suggested as a 
solution to this problem but need suitable evaluation (including methods to quantify 
deterrence).  Ultimately, it is hard to disagree with the NAO’s [6]  assessment of the 
importance of deterrence and accountability: the “key issue” is “providing a financial 
incentive to Trusts to reduce incidents involving negligence (this is absent if they do not 
pay for them).” (para. 17). 
 
A number of reforms may be available within the framework of tort and these must also 
be evaluated.  We have indicated that reforms to the legal system should be considered 
(and evaluated) here.  However, as the government has made clear [2], a number of 
others will be considered as part of its White Paper review.  These include fixed tariffs 
for injuries (once fault has been established), the use of structured settlements as opposed 
to the payment of a lump-sum on completion of the case, and greater use of mediation 
along-side the current tort system.  ([1] discusses other reform options.) 
 
It is clear that the system in the UK merits scrutiny, evaluation and (no doubt) some 
measure of reform.  We have seen, however, that Danzon [1, p. 389] characterises reform 
in this area as choosing amongst imperfect alternatives with limited empirical 
information.  We hope that the present paper explains this position and, in so doing, 
shows why economic efficiency should be borne in mind when making policy choices in 
this important area.  
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